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Abstract. In this paper, we investigate the impact of market structure on the
relationship between inﬂation and price dispersion. We ﬁrst propose a new empirical
model of the relationship between inﬂation and dispersion with ﬁrmer theoretical
foundations, and then extend the basic model to incorporate the potential eﬀects
of market structure. We estimate the basic and market structure speciﬁcations
using a unique micro-level data set from Istanbul, which consists of monthly price
observations from three diﬀerent store types: convenience stores, open-air markets,
and supermarkets. Our empirical ﬁndings support almost all of the basic and market
structure predictions.
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The relationship between inﬂation and price dispersion has been the focus of an ex-
tensive empirical and theoretical literature, which contributes to our understanding
of the transaction costs of inﬂation, as well as the inﬂuence of macroeconomic activ-
ity on industry performance. The empirical literature includes Domberger (1987),
Van Hoomissen (1988), Lach and Tsiddon (1992), Tommasi (1993), and Parsley
(1996), among others.1 With some notable exceptions, including Reinsdorf (1994),
the consensus seems to be that there is a positive association between inﬂation and
dispersion.
The theoretical literature consists of static equilibrium search models, menu
cost models, signal extraction models, and the information investment model. Static
equilibrium search models, such as Reinganum (1979), assume that consumers have
imperfect information about prices and therefore engage in costly search. In the
menu cost literature, including Sheshinski and Weiss (1977, 1983) and B´ enabou
(1988, 1992), an increase in anticipated inﬂation increases dispersion when there are
non-zero costs of adjusting nominal prices (menu costs). In the signal extraction
literature, including B´ enabou and Gertner (1993) and Dana (1994), an increase
in unanticipated inﬂation increases dispersion by reducing the informational con-
tent of observed prices. Finally, in the information investment model sketched in
Van Hoomissen (1988), an increase in anticipated inﬂation increases dispersion by
increasing the depreciation rate on information. Furthermore, current dispersion
depends on lagged dispersion, since the latter reﬂects the pre-search stock of infor-
mation.
In this paper, we investigate the impact of market structure on the relationship
between inﬂation and dispersion.2 We begin by establishing the market structure
1 In this paper, we focus exclusively on intra-market relative price variability; i.e., price disper-
sion for an essentially homogeneous good. There is also a substantial literature on inter-market
relative price variability, including Vining and Elwertowski (1976), Parks (1978), and Debelle and
Lamont (1997).
2 “Market structure” refers to diﬀerences in market power; ﬁxed, menu, and search costs; and
1predictions of static equilibrium search models, menu cost models, and signal ex-
traction models. Static equilibrium search models predict that dispersion should be
greater in markets involving higher search costs and more inelastic demand, where
the latter result has an obvious interpretation in terms of market power. According
to menu cost models, the relationship between dispersion and anticipated inﬂation
depends on ﬁxed and transaction (menu and search) costs, as well as other param-
eters. Finally, the B´ enabou and Gertner (1993) signal extraction model derives
a relationship between dispersion and unanticipated inﬂation which diﬀers across
markets with diﬀerent search costs.
We test these predictions using a unique micro-level data set, consisting of
monthly price observations collected in Istanbul over the period 1992:10-2000:06.
Each observation corresponds to one of three distinct market structures: bakkals
(convenience stores), pazars (open-air markets), and Western-style supermarkets.
Crucially, these three store types can be plausibly ranked pazars < bakkals < su-
permarkets with respect to market power, and ﬁxed, menu, and search costs, which
permits an unambiguous mapping from the theoretical predictions to the data.
Before analyzing the impact of market structure on the relationship between
inﬂation and dispersion, we address some fundamental speciﬁcation issues. In par-
ticular, menu cost models, signal extraction models, and the information investment
model predict diﬀerent inﬂation-dispersion relationships, involving diﬀerent inﬂa-
tion variables, whereas empirical speciﬁcations of that relationship typically include
just one or two inﬂation variables. Speciﬁcally, menu cost models refer to antici-
pated aggregate inﬂation, signal extraction models to unanticipated product-speciﬁc
(PS) inﬂation (i.e., the inﬂation rate for that particular product), while the in-
formation investment model identiﬁes lagged dispersion, anticipated PS inﬂation,
and unanticipated PS inﬂation as important explanatory variables. A well-speciﬁed
empirical model must therefore include all of these explanatory variables in the
other characteristics across diﬀerent markets.
2same regression. To demonstrate the potential for misspeciﬁcation bias, we use our
data set to estimate a standard empirical model similar to that in Reinsdorf (1994).
We then show that adding theoretically important explanatory variables (speciﬁ-
cally, lagged dispersion) produces qualitatively diﬀerent results. These ﬁndings cast
substantial doubt on previous empirical results.
Having established an empirical speciﬁcation which more accurately reﬂects the
theoretical literature, we proceed to test the above market structure predictions.
Our ﬁndings support all of those predictions except possibly those derived from
menu cost models. First, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant store-type ﬁxed eﬀects on dispersion
levels, with supermarkets exhibiting the greatest dispersion, followed by bakkals,
then pazars. The ranking pazars < bakkals < supermarkets in terms of dispersion
levels is consistent with static equilibrium search models, since the same ranking
should also hold with respect to market power and search costs. We also ﬁnd
signiﬁcant diﬀerences across store types in the relationship between dispersion and
unanticipated inﬂation, as predicted by signal extraction models. Finally, we ﬁnd
that supermarket dispersion is reduced during seasonal sales periods, whereas bakkal
and pazar dispersion is unaﬀected, which we explain in terms of the erosion of
supermarkets’ market power during such periods. However, our results may be
inconsistent with menu cost models, since there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences across
store types in the relationship between dispersion and anticipated inﬂation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the
theoretical literatures on static equilibrium search models, menu cost models, signal
extraction models, and the information investment model. In section 3, we describe
the data and deﬁne the relevant variables. Section 4 demonstrates the potential
for misspeciﬁcation bias when theoretically important explanatory variables are
neglected. In section 5, we propose a new empirical speciﬁcation of the relationship
between inﬂation and dispersion and estimate it using our data set. In section 6, we
investigate the impact of market structure on that relationship. Section 7 concludes.
32. Theoretical Foundations
In this section, we discuss the theoretical literatures on static equilibrium search
models, menu cost models, signal extraction models, and the information investment
model.
Static Equilibrium Search Models
In static equilibrium search models, for example Reinganum (1979), consumers have
imperfect information about prices and engage in costly search. An equilibrium
price distribution simultaneously supports optimal consumer search and is induced
by the proﬁt-maximizing prices set by ﬁrms, which take as given the distribution of
consumers’ reservation levels. In these models, dispersion is increasing in consumers’
search costs and decreasing in the price elasticity of demand.3 The latter result
can be interpreted in terms of ﬁrms’ market power: an increase in market power
increases dispersion.
Menu Cost Models
The menu cost literature includes, among others, Sheshinski and Weiss (1977, 1983)
and B´ enabou (1988, 1992). In these models, inﬂation is constant and fully antic-
ipated and ﬁrms follow optimal (S,s) pricing policies because of non-zero menu
costs. An increase in anticipated inﬂation induces ﬁrms to widen their (S,s)b a n d s
in order to conserve on menu costs, thereby increasing dispersion. During deﬂa-
tionary periods, the model works in reverse. Menu cost models therefore predict
a V-shaped relationship between dispersion and expected inﬂation; i.e., dispersion
increases when either expected inﬂation or expected deﬂation increases.4
3 For example, consider the Reinganum (1979) equilibrium search model. If the demand
function is q(p)=pe and ﬁrms’ costs are uniformly distributed on [0,1], then for elasticities
−2 <e<−1, the equilibrium price distribution is uniform on [0,p r] with an atom of ﬁrms charg-
ing the reservation level pr. A reduction in market power (more negative e) induces ﬁrms to lower
their prices, so pr falls, the atom there grows, and dispersion is reduced. Of course, if demand is
perfectly elastic, the Law of One Price obtains.
4 An increase in deﬂation refers to a more negative inﬂation rate.
4Some empirical studies attempt to test the predictions of menu cost models us-
ing expected PS inﬂation, the expected component of the inﬂation rate of the speciﬁc
product in question. However, in menu cost models PS inﬂation is an endogenous
variable which is a consequence of ﬁrms’ equilibrium pricing strategies. Instead,
these models derive a theoretical relationship between dispersion and an expected
exogenous inﬂation rate such as expected macroeconomic inﬂation in Sheshinski and
Weiss (1977) or expected inﬂation in input prices in B´ enabou (1988, 1992).5 In this
paper, we therefore test the predictions of menu cost models using a broad-based
cost-of-living (COL) index for Istanbul. Since the COL index is speciﬁc to Istanbul,
expected COL inﬂation should provide a good proxy for the expected aggregate
inﬂation rate aﬀecting local sellers.6
In the B´ enabou (1988) menu cost model, the relationship between dispersion
and anticipated inﬂation depends on ﬁxed and transaction (menu and search) costs,
as well as other parameters. Since the store types in our data set can be plausibly
ranked pazars < bakkals < supermarkets with respect to ﬁxed and transaction costs
(see the next section for a description of these store types), one would expect the
relationship between dispersion and expected inﬂation to diﬀer across these market
structures.7 In this paper, we test for systematic diﬀerences in that relationship
across store types by estimating a speciﬁcation which allows the slope coeﬃcients
on expected COL inﬂation to diﬀer across store types.
Signal Extraction Models
The literature on signal extraction with search frictions includes B´ enabou and Gert-
ner (1993) and Dana (1994). The former predicts a V-shaped relationship between
5 In B´ enabou (1988, 1992), PS inﬂation equals aggregate inﬂation in steady-state equilibrium,
but this is unlikely to characterize real-world data sets or more general theoretical models.
6 Using CPI inﬂation instead of COL inﬂation produced qualitatively similar empirical results.
7 Indeed, preliminary simulations of the B´ enabou (1988) menu cost model suggest that the
ranking pazars < bakkals < supermarkets with respect to ﬁxed and transaction costs should
imply systematic diﬀerences in the slope coeﬃcients on anticipated inﬂation across these market
structures. The details of the simulations are available from the authors upon request.
5dispersion and unexpected inﬂation, because an increase in the absolute value of
unexpected inﬂation induces consumers to search less, by reducing the informa-
tional content of observed prices. Furthermore, the model also predicts that higher
search costs will be associated with higher dispersion levels (as in static equilibrium
search models and menu cost models) and diﬀerences in search costs will lead to
diﬀerential changes in dispersion following an increase in unexpected inﬂation.8
Some empirical studies attempt to test the predictions of signal extraction
models using unexpected aggregate inﬂation. However, in the absence of Lucas-type
confusion, it is clear that signal extraction models refer to unexpected PS inﬂation,
since unexpected aggregate inﬂation will reﬂect shocks to other industries. In other
words, the search decisions of a rational, well-informed consumer shopping for good
As h o u l dn o tb ea ﬀ e c t e db yu n e x p e c t e ds h o c k si nt h em a r k e tf o ra nu n r e l a t e d
good B. We will test this hypothesis by including both unexpected PS inﬂation and
unexpected COL inﬂation in our empirical model.
Information Investment Model
In menu cost and signal extraction models, individual consumers only purchase the
good once. In contrast, Van Hoomissen (1988) poses the repeat-purchase search
problem as an optimal investment decision where search not only reduces the cur-
rent purchase price, it also adds to the consumer’s current stock of information.
Information depreciates because it can be forgotten or become obsolete. In partic-
ular, an increase in expected (permanent) inﬂation increases the depreciation rate
on information, inducing consumers to hold smaller information stocks (although
s e a r c hc a ng oe i t h e rw a y ) ,w h i c hs h o u l di n c r e a s ed i s p e r s i o ni nc u r r e n ta n df u t u r e
periods. Dispersion should therefore show some persistence. Indeed, current dis-
persion depends on lagged dispersion, since the latter reﬂects the pre-search stock
of information. As far as we know, this is the ﬁrst paper to investigate the empirical
8 These predictions are based on Tables 1-3 in B´ enabou and Gertner (1993).
6importance of lagged dispersion. Furthermore, a burst of unexpected inﬂation may
increase dispersion in current and future periods while consumers replenish their
information stocks. Again, in the absence of Lucas-type confusion, expected PS
inﬂation is the appropriate proxy for the depreciation rate on information, since an
increase in expected inﬂation for good A should not increase the depreciation rate
on the consumer’s stock of information for an unrelated good B.
Theoretical Conclusions
In summary, the theoretical literature makes two distinct sets of predictions about
the relationship between inﬂation and dispersion. The ﬁrst set of predictions, which
we call the basic predictions, concerns the change in dispersion with respect to a
change in one of the inﬂation variables. These are summarized in Table 1 below.
Table 1 At The Back Goes Here
The second set of predictions, the market structure predictions, concerns diﬀerences
in the relationship between inﬂation and dispersion across markets which diﬀer in
terms of market power, ﬁxed costs, and transaction costs. We test both sets of
predictions in this paper.
3. Data and Deﬁnitions
Data
The data consist of monthly price observations for 58 distinct products, mostly food-
stuﬀs, listed in appendix A. These observations span the period 1992:10 to 2000:06,
during which the average inﬂation rate was high but relatively stable at about 60%
per annum.9 The Istanbul Chamber of Commerce collects this data to construct a
9 The stability of inﬂation during the sample period may be signiﬁcant, since Caglayan and
Filiztekin (2003) have shown that the empirical link between inﬂation and dispersion can break
down in the presence of large structural breaks.
7broad-based COL index for wage earners in Istanbul, which we also use. The 58
products listed in appendix A comprise 25% of the entire COL index.10 Whenever
possible, the data collectors visited the same vendor to record price observations on
the same product (same brand, quantity/weight, and other characteristics).
Each price entry pijkt in our data set is indexed by the product i, the neigh-
borhood (borough) j in Istanbul where it was collected, the store type k, and the
month t. Each entry corresponds to one of three distinct store types: bakkals,
pazars, and supermarkets. Bakkals are small convenience stores which are almost
always family-owned and operated. Each neighborhood has at least a dozen bakkals
and usually many more. Bakkals are also local institutions with an important so-
cial dimension, as consumers tend to drop in to buy one or two items and exchange
news and gossip with the owner. Pazars are open-air markets for fresh produce and
small consumer items. These markets approach the perfectly competitive ideal,
since sellers operate small stalls with 1-4 products each, and each product generally
has several sellers. There is one main pazar in each neighborhood, open one day a
week. Turkish supermarkets are similar to their Western counterparts. They are
relatively large, corporate-owned, and stock a wide variety of distinct products and
brands. There are typically 1-2 supermarkets per neighborhood, centrally located.
Note that all of these store types are major institutions with many customers, so
our results are not biased due to a lack of consumers for some store type.
We now characterize these three store types in terms of the parameters of the
theoretical models discussed in the previous section. In terms of market power,
one would expect the ranking pazars < bakkals < supermarkets to apply, with
supermarkets having the greatest degree of market power and pazars very little.
Bakkals may have some local market power, since people tend to patronize their
“favorite” bakkal. With respect to menu costs, one would expect the same ranking
10 The COL index includes the following categories: Food; Dwelling Expenses; Household Ex-
penses; Clothing, Health, and Personal Care; Transportation and Communication; Culture, Edu-
cation, and Entertainment; and Other.
8to apply due to the relative sizes of these organizations. The same ranking should
also hold in terms of their associated search costs, the opportunity cost of soliciting
another price quote. Once inside the pazar, the search cost is very low, since there
are many sellers selling essentially the same item within a small geographical area.
The search costs associated with bakkals should also be fairly low, since these are
convenience stores located mainly in residential areas, so the closest alternative is
likely to be another bakkal, a short walk away. In contrast, supermarkets tend to be
geographically isolated from other sellers, so obtaining another price quote generally
entails a trip by car or public transportation. Finally, one would also expect the
same ranking in terms of ﬁxed costs. In particular, bakkals and supermarkets own
or rent signiﬁcant shopping space, whereas pazar sellers operate simple stalls.
A potential problem with the pazar data is that, although pazar operators are
legally required to post explicit prices, the actual purchase price may be determined
by haggling, whereas our data set only records the posted prices. Nevertheless, we
believe the pazar data are useful, because the issues involved in setting the posted
prices are similar to those in menu cost and signal extraction models. In particular,
consumers will make signal extraction-type inferences based on the posted prices.
Furthermore, if the posted price is too high, the seller will attract little consumer
interest, and if the posted price is too low, the seller’s proﬁt margins will be neg-
atively aﬀected, since the actual price will not exceed the posted one. Hence, the
posted prices should be useful for testing the predictions of menu cost and signal
extraction models, even if the actual and posted prices diﬀer. In fact, casual obser-
vation suggests that in the morning, which is when the Chamber inspectors collect
the data, the bulk of the transactions occur at the posted price. Haggling is more
important in the afternoon, when sellers are eager to get rid of their stocks. In
Figure 1, we plot dispersion [deﬁned in equation (3) below] across time for each
store type.
Figure 1 Goes Here
9For present purposes, we note that the dispersion series for pazars is similar to the
others, suggesting that similar forces are at work determining all three. For the
sceptical reader, in appendix B we report our ﬁndings following the same empirical
analysis as in the text, except that only the bakkal and supermarket data are used
(haggling is not a feature of these markets). The results are essentially the same.
See tables B2-B4 in appendix B, which correspond to tables 2-4 in the text.
Deﬁnitions
We make the standard deﬁnition that the relative price of product i in neighborhood
j sold by store type k in month t is deﬁned by












is the average price of the product at date t, J = 15 is the number of neighborhoods,



















Note that many empirical studies use relative price change variability to measure
price dispersion as opposed to relative price level variability as deﬁned in (3). How-
ever, as Lach and Tsiddon (1992, Section III) concede and Reinsdorf (1994, Section
IV) emphasizes, the theoretical literature refers speciﬁcally to relative price level
variability. Indeed, these two dispersion measures are not equivalent and may have
diﬀerent relationships with inﬂation, so in this paper we only refer to relative price
10level variability as deﬁned in (3). The product-speciﬁc (PS) inﬂation rate for prod-












πijkt =l n ( pijkt/pijk(t−1)). (6)
Expected and Unexpected Inﬂation
To relate our empirical analysis to the theoretical models discussed in section 2,
we need to decompose both COL and PS inﬂation into their expected (permanent)
and unexpected (transitory) components. For purposes of comparison, we follow the
same procedure used in Lach and Tsiddon (1992) and Reinsdorf (1994). According
to this procedure, we regress PSt against PSt−1,PSt−2,... up to six lags, past
values of COL inﬂation up to three lags, and deterministic components including a
constant, linear trend, and time dummies. For each product i, the appropriate lag
length and the choice of which deterministic components to include is determined
by the Schwarz Information Criteria. For each estimation, the residuals are tested
for serial correlation and autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity up to six
lags. If the residuals are clean with respect to these anomalies at conventional
signiﬁcance levels, the ﬁtted values are used as the expected inﬂation series EPSt
and the residuals are used as unexpected inﬂation UPSt. If the serial correlation or
ARCH tests failed, we used the second-best speciﬁcation according to the Schwarz
Information Criteria, and so on. The same procedure was used to decompose COL
inﬂation into its expected ECOLt and unexpected UCOLt components except that
11 Alternatively, one could deﬁne separate PS inﬂation rates for each store type. Although
regressing store-type dispersion against store-type PS inﬂation seems more parsimonious than using
overall PS inﬂation, there is no theoretical basis for using such narrow inﬂation variables. From
the perspective of signal extraction models, using store-type PS inﬂation would imply, for example,
that a consumer who observes high apple prices at the pazar would not use this information to
make inferences about bakkal apple prices.
11only past values of COL inﬂation were used, along with deterministic components
including a constant, linear trend, and time dummies.12
Other Issues
In the empirical literature, inﬂation and price dispersion are calculated at the city-
level, implicitly assuming that cities are markets. However, one may doubt that
cities as large as New York and Istanbul can be usefully thought of as markets.
Following Marshall, Stigler (1985, 1987) argues that markets tend to be fairly large,
because buyers’ small search radii overlap to such an extent as to bind the city
together. Furthermore, the size of a market “will be at least as large as the larger
of the areas of sellers’ competition and buyers’ competition, or the sum of the areas
when they partially overlap.” (1987, p. 78). He also discusses some evidence
supporting this claim, including data on potato prices. It therefore seems that the
relevant question is not whether Istanbul is too large to be considered a market,
but rather that it might be too small.
Another feature of the empirical literature is that dispersion is calculated by
product, rather than by seller, or even type of seller. The implicit assumption is that
competition occurs at the product level, rather than the ﬁrm level. This is almost
certainly invalid for supermarkets, which exploit the fact that their customers buy
large baskets of items. However, this objection seems much less applicable to our
data set, since it is clear that buyers in pazars shop for goods, not sellers. This is
because each pazar operator only sells 1-4 items, and each of those typically has
many other sellers. Hence, one may buy apples from one seller, and oranges from
another. A similar comment applies to bakkals. One may enter a bakkal to buy
bread, or a bottle of water, or some sweets, but not a large basket. So the ability of
supermarkets to price baskets of items is disciplined by competition from bakkals
and pazars. Note that the latter play a much larger role in the shopping patterns
12 The details of the decomposition procedure are available from the authors upon request.
12of Turkish consumers, compared with farmers’ markets in North America, with
supermarkets playing a smaller role in Turkey.
4. Common Speciﬁcations
We begin our empirical analysis with a very basic speciﬁcation, which is common
in the literature:












Tn + β |PSt| + ut (7)
where Vt is price dispersion as deﬁned in (3), α is a constant, |PSt| is the absolute
value of PS inﬂation, and ut is the regression error term. We take the absolute
value of PSt, since all the theoretical models discussed in section 2 predict a V-
shaped relationship between dispersion and the relevant inﬂation variable. The
model also includes dummy variables to control for ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁc to particular
products λi, store types θk (where k = b,p,s for bakkal, pazar, and supermarket,
respectively), months τl, and years Tn.
The estimates for this ﬁxed-eﬀects regression model are reported in Table 2,
column 1.
Table 2 Goes Here
The estimated coeﬃcient on θs is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level, indi-
cating that supermarkets exhibit greater dispersion than bakkals, ceteris paribus.
Similarly, the estimated coeﬃcient on θp is negative and signiﬁcant, indicating that
pazars exhibit less dispersion than bakkals. These ﬁndings are consistent with most
static equilibrium search models, since these store types can be plausibly ranked
pazars < bakkals < supermarkets in terms of market power and search costs. These
estimates also conﬁrm the visual evidence in Figure 1. The coeﬃcient β on |PSt|
characterizes the relationship between PS inﬂation and dispersion for this model.
The estimate for β is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level, which agrees with
13the usual ﬁnding that there is a V-shaped relationship between dispersion and PS
inﬂation.
Asymmetric Impact of Inﬂation vs. Deﬂation
As Jaramillo (1999) demonstrates, conclusions about the empirical relationship be-
tween inﬂation and dispersion can hinge on the proper treatment of outliers, espe-
cially those corresponding to deﬂationary episodes. In order to properly account
for these, we introduce a dummy variable D<0 which equals 1 when PS inﬂation is
negative (deﬂation) and zero otherwise:












Tn + β |PSt| + γD <0 |PSt| + ut. (8)
This model therefore allows for an asymmetric V-shaped relationship between dis-
persion and PS inﬂation.
The estimates are reported in Table 2, column 2. We observe that β and γ
are positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level, indicating an asymmetric V-shaped
relationship. Speciﬁcally, a unit increase in inﬂation increases dispersion by about
β =0 .043, while a unit increase in deﬂation increases dispersion by about β + γ =
0.06. Similar asymmetries, involving a larger change in dispersion for increases in
deﬂation, have been reported by Reinsdorf (1994) and Jamarillo (1999).
Note that menu cost models can explain such asymmetries with respect to
aggregate inﬂation variables. As B´ enabou (1992, p. 303) points out, menu costs
include all costs of a nominal price change not captured by the model, not just the
direct costs of changing sticker prices. For example, a ﬁrm which raises its price
may lose some of its valuable reputation as a low-price ﬁrm. Similarly, if ﬁrms are
colluding, then a ﬁrm which lowers its price runs the risk of sparking a damaging
price war. Hence, the menu cost of raising price may diﬀer from the menu cost of
lowering price, which may lead to an asymmetric eﬀect on dispersion depending on
whether the inﬂationary episode is inﬂationary or deﬂationary.
14Eﬀects of Expected vs. Unexpected Inﬂation
We now estimate a speciﬁcation similar to that in Lach and Tsiddon (1992, Table
2) and Reinsdorf (1994), which relates dispersion to expected and unexpected PS
inﬂation:
Vt = β1 |EPSt| + β2 |UPSt| + γ1 D<0 |EPSt| + γ2 D<0 |UPSt| + ut. (9)
The decomposition of PS inﬂation into its expected and unexpected components is
intended to separately test the predictions of menu cost and signal extraction mod-
els, respectively. We also allow for an asymmetric V-shaped relationship between
dispersion and each of these inﬂation variables. Note that while an asymmetric
V-shaped relationship between dispersion and expected inﬂation is consistent with
menu cost models, signal extraction models do not suggest any reason for such
asymmetries involving unexpected inﬂation. The regression also includes a con-
stant as well as product, store-type, and time dummies, but for simplicity we do
not display them.13
In Table 2, column 3, the estimates for β1, β2,a n dγ1 are all positive and
signiﬁcant at the 5% level. We therefore ﬁnd an asymmetric V-shaped relationship
between dispersion and expected PS inﬂation, with a steeper slope for expected PS
deﬂation. Momentarily suppressing our reservations about the relevance of expected
PS inﬂation for menu cost models, this is consistent with greater menu costs of
lowering price than raising price. We also ﬁnd a symmetric V-shaped relationship
between dispersion and unexpected PS inﬂation, which is consistent with signal
extraction models. It is also consistent with the information investment model.
Lagged Dispersion
Our results thus far are similar to previous ﬁndings in the empirical literature.
However, speciﬁcations (7)-(9) do not include any aggregate inﬂation variables and
13 From now on, we refrain from displaying these variables, although they always enter the
estimation procedure.
15may therefore fail to adequately capture menu cost eﬀects. Furthermore, PS inﬂa-
tion and expected PS inﬂation are endogenous variables, and should therefore be
proxied by appropriate instrumental variables, which is rarely (if ever) done in the
empirical literature. Finally, lagged dispersion is neglected, which is an important
explanatory variable according to the information investment model. Indeed, in-
spection of Figure 1 above suggests that dispersion exhibits some persistence, so
failing to include it may lead to biased and inconsistent estimates. As a ﬁrst step,
we therefore add Vt−1 to the model in (9):
Vt = β0 Vt−1 + β1 |EPSt| + β2 |UPSt| + γ1 D<0 |EPSt| + γ2 D<0 |UPSt| + ut. (10)
The model now has a dynamic structure, and we use the one-step GMM estimation
procedure for dynamic panels analyzed in Arellano and Bond (1991).14
In Table 3, column 1, we observe that β0 is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1%
level, which is consistent with the information investment model.
Table 3 Goes Here
Interestingly, the coeﬃcients β1 and γ1, which were positive and signiﬁcant in Ta-
ble 2, column 3 have now become insigniﬁcant with the inclusion of Vt−1. In other
words, the empirical link between expected PS inﬂation and dispersion has com-
pletely disappeared. We conclude that either menu cost eﬀects are absent from our
data, or that expected PS inﬂation fails to adequately capture those eﬀects. The
result β1 = 0 is also inconsistent with the prediction of the information investment
model that an increase in expected PS inﬂation should increase current as well as
14 Arellano and Bond (1991) report that the Sargan test has asymptotic chi-squre distribution
only if the error terms are homoskedastic, and that it over-rejects the null hypothesis of valid
instruments in the presence of heteroskedasticity, which seems likely for our sample. Furthermore,
they recommend using one-step results for inference on coeﬃcients, as the estimated standard
errors from the two-step method would be downward biased. We adopt this suggestion, and
present one-step estimation results while implementing the Huber-White robust standard error
estimation procedure to control for possible heteroskedasticity. All computations were performed
by STATA, where lagged values of the inﬂation variables and the lagged dependant variable were
used as instruments.
16future dispersion. A possible explanation for this ﬁnding could be that the eﬀect of
expected PS inﬂation on current dispersion is too small to detect, although the total
eﬀect on future dispersion is signiﬁcant and is captured by the coeﬃcient on lagged
dispersion. Note that the results for β2 and γ2 are not qualitatively changed from
Table 2, so the data continue to support the basic prediction of signal extraction
models after lagged dispersion has been included. These results cast substantial
doubt on ﬁndings obtained from speciﬁcations similar to that in (9), such as those
in Reinsdorf (1994), which fail to include lagged dispersion. Furthermore, Reins-
dorf’s (1994) ﬁnding of a negative relationship between inﬂation and dispersion may
not adequately account for menu cost eﬀects, since aggregate inﬂation variables are
not included in his study.
5. A New Speciﬁcation
Our ﬁndings in the previous section demonstrate the potential for misspeciﬁcation
bias when important theoretical explanatory variables are omitted. In this section,
we therefore propose a new speciﬁcation of the relationship between inﬂation and
dispersion based on the theoretical conclusions in section 2:
Vt =β0 Vt−1 + β1 |EPSt| + β2 |UPSt| + β3 |ECOLt| + β4 |UCOLt|+
γ1 D<0 |EPSt| + γ2 D<0 |UPSt|+
γ3 D<0 |ECOLt| + γ4 D<0 |UCOLt| + ut. (11)
As summarized in Table 1 above, this speciﬁcation includes lagged dispersion and
expected PS inﬂation to capture information investment eﬀects, expected COL in-
ﬂation for menu cost eﬀects, and unexpected PS inﬂation for information investment
and signal extraction eﬀects. We also include unexpected COL inﬂation to test the
hypothesis that consumers are not fooled by unexpected aggregate inﬂation. Fi-
nally, we allow for asymmetric V-shaped relationships between dispersion and each
of the inﬂation variables.15
15 We do not include lagged inﬂation variables in (11), since those eﬀects should already be
17In column 2 of Table 3, the estimates for β0, β1, β2, γ1,a n dγ2 are qualita-
tively the same as in column 1 and require no further comment. Turning to the
results for COL inﬂation, β3 is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level, indicating a
V-shaped relationship between dispersion and expected COL inﬂation, as predicted
by menu cost models. Note that our data set contains only two observations of
expected COL deﬂation. As Jaramillo (1999) points out, testing for an asymmet-
ric relationship is therefore equivalent to testing whether those two observations of
expected COL deﬂation are inﬂuential outliers. Since γ3 is positive and signiﬁcant
at the 1% level, this is indeed the case. It also hints that the V-shaped relationship
between dispersion and expected COL inﬂation may be asymmetric, with a steeper
slope for expected COL deﬂation. Note that Jaramillo, who had more deﬂationary
observations to work with, found just such a relationship between dispersion and
aggregate inﬂation. As for unexpected COL inﬂation, β4 and γ4 are both insignif-
icant which suggests that, in the main, consumers are not fooled by unexpected
changes in COL inﬂation. Except for expected PS inﬂation, these ﬁndings agree
with the predictions in Table 1. The data therefore provide strong support for the
basic predictions of menu cost and signal extraction models, with less support for
the information investment model.
6. The Impact of Market Structure
We have now established an empirical speciﬁcation (11) with ﬁrmer theoretical
foundations compared with the existing empirical literature, and shown that our
data support all but one of the basic predictions in Table 1. We now extend the
basic model in (11) to incorporate the potential eﬀects of market structure on
the relationship between inﬂation and dispersion, and proceed to test the market
captured by lagged dispersion. Indeed, Vt−1 is the key theoretical lagged variable, since it proxies
consumers’ information stocks at date t, and may incorporate other factors besides inﬂation, such
as the eﬀects of supermarket advertising.
18structure predictions. Speciﬁcally, we consider the model
Vt =β0Vt−1 + β1 |EPSt| + β2 θp |EPSt| + β3 θs |EPSt|+
β4 |UPSt| + β5 θp |UPSt| + β6 θs |UPSt|+
β7 |ECOLt| + β8 θp |ECOLt| + β9 θs |ECOLt|+
β10 |UCOLt| + β11 θp |UCOLt| + β12 θs |UCOLt|+
γ1 D<0 |EPSt| + γ2 D<0 θp |EPSt| + γ3 D<0 θs |EPSt|+
γ4 D<0 |UPSt| + γ5 D<0 θp |UPSt| + γ6 D<0 θs |UPSt|+
γ7 D<0 |ECOLt| + γ8 D<0 θp |ECOLt| + γ9 D<0 θs |ECOLt|+
γ10 D<0 |UCOLt| + γ11 D<0 θp |UCOLt|+
γ12 D<0 θs |UCOLt| + ut. (12)
This speciﬁcation includes the same explanatory variables as (11), except that now
the inﬂation variables enter in conjunction with the store-type dummies θp and θs,
which allows for diﬀerent slope coeﬃcients across store types. The estimates are
reported in Table 4.
Table 4 Goes Here
Expected PS Inﬂation
In Table 4, all the coeﬃcients corresponding to expected PS inﬂation are insigniﬁ-
cant except for γ3, which is negative and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. In other words,
the only eﬀect of expected PS inﬂation is that an increase in expected PS deﬂation
reduces supermarket dispersion.
To investigate why expected PS deﬂation should be associated with lower dis-
persion for supermarkets, but not for bakkals or pazars, we study the pattern of
PS deﬂation in our data. These observations correspond to falling nominal prices,
which seem remarkable against the backdrop of 60% average inﬂation in Turkey. We
19note that there are 520 instances of PS deﬂation in our data set and 342 instances
of expected PS deﬂation, so these are not rare occurrences.
In Figure 2, we plot the proportion of ﬁrms within each store type reducing
nominal price at each date in the sample.
Figure 2 Goes Here
For present purposes, the most striking feature of Figure 2 is the seasonal price
reductions, mainly by pazars, which occur every year during the warm months
April-August, although the exact months vary from year to year. In other words,
we seem to be observing annual summer sales.16
In Figure 3, we plot the distribution (relative frequency) of actual PS deﬂation
and expected PS deﬂation across the months of the year.
Figure 3 Goes Here
We observe that the distribution for PS deﬂation peaks on April-July, which shows
that the price cuts in Figure 2 tend to be associated with falling prices on average
across all sellers, so these are market-wide sales. Furthermore, the distribution of
expected PS deﬂation provides a relatively good, albeit imperfect, approximation
to that for actual PS deﬂation, so the former variable should capture some of the
eﬀect of seasonal sales on dispersion.17 Note that this is a consequence of the fact
that Turkish inﬂation was relatively stable over the sample period. When inﬂation
is volatile, expected inﬂation may be a poor predictor of actual inﬂation.
This suggests a straightforward explanation as to why expected PS deﬂation
should be associated with lower dispersion for supermarkets, but not for bakkals or
16 There may be other, smaller or less regular, annual sales periods. In particular, in Figures 2
and 3 there is some indication of a fall/winter sale centered on November which is also associated
with PS and expected PS deﬂation.
17 Although monthly dummies were used, they may not adequately control for the eﬀects of
the sales periods on dispersion, since the sales periods vary from year to year in terms of their
magnitude, duration, and the months in which they occur.
20pazars. For most of the year, supermarkets possess a signiﬁcant degree of market
power, and the exercise of that power may partly explain why supermarkets exhibit
the greatest level of dispersion. During seasonal sales periods, however, a substan-
tial proportion of pazar sellers cut their prices, perhaps as a passive response to
some major exogenous force such as the agricultural cycle. Given the character
of pazar operators, their price-setting behavior is unlikely to be strategic. In the
face of these price cuts, which correspond to falling prices on average across all
sellers, supermarkets have little choice but to price their products more compet-
itively, reducing price in some cases and restricting price increases in others. As
a result of the erosion of their market power, supermarket dispersion is reduced.
Since expected PS deﬂation is a good predictor of PS deﬂation, we ﬁnd a negative
relationship between the former and supermarket dispersion. In contrast, the eﬀect
on dispersion for bakkals and pazars is negligible since these ﬁrms have little or no
market power.
Unexpected PS Inﬂation
We now turn to the results for unexpected PS inﬂation. The coeﬃcient β4 is positive
and signiﬁcant at the 5% level, while β5, γ4,a n dγ5 are all insigniﬁcant. We therefore
ﬁnd a symmetric V-shaped relationship between dispersion and unexpected PS
inﬂation which is identical for bakkals and pazars. This ﬁnding may be consistent
with signal extraction models, since the search costs for bakkals and pazars should
be relatively low, and the diﬀerence may be too small to detect any diﬀerence in the
relationship. With respect to supermarkets, we would expect the relationship to be
diﬀerent from that for bakkals and pazars, since the search cost for supermarkets
should be signiﬁcantly higher. Indeed, β6 is positive and signiﬁcant at the 10% level,
while γ6 is negative and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. If we accept the estimate for β6,
then the V-shaped relationship between supermarket dispersion and unexpected
PS inﬂation has a slope of β4 + β6 =0 .11 on the positive side and a slope of
21β4 + β6 + γ6 =0 .001 on the negative (unexpected PS deﬂation) side.18
To explain these ﬁndings for supermarkets, we note that there are 2,960 in-
stances of unexpected PS deﬂation in the data, so again these are not rare. These
refer to statistically unexpected PS deﬂation, as determined by the procedure de-
scribed in section 3, and not all of these will have been genuinely unanticipated by
buyers and sellers in Istanbul. Hence, unexpected PS deﬂation captures two separate
eﬀects. First, the component of unexpected PS deﬂation genuinely unanticipated by
buyers and sellers in Istanbul will have signal extraction eﬀects, reducing the infor-
mational content of observed prices, leading to a symmetric V-shaped relationship
between dispersion and unexpected PS inﬂation. Since search costs are higher for
supermarkets, this relationship should be diﬀerent from that for bakkals and pazars
and, in fact, we ﬁnd a steeper slope for supermarkets. Second, some component of
actual PS deﬂation corresponding to seasonal sales will have been statistically un-
expected, and therefore negatively correlated with supermarket dispersion. These
two eﬀects may largely cancel out, leaving a very ﬂat slope on the deﬂation side for
supermarkets.
Expected COL Inﬂation
In Table 4, β7 is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level, while β8 and β9 are
insigniﬁcant, indicating a V-shaped relationship between dispersion and expected
COL inﬂation which is identical for all three store types. The coeﬃcients γ7, γ8,
and γ9 are all signiﬁcant at conventional signiﬁcance levels, so the two observations
of expected COL deﬂation are again inﬂuential outliers.
As in Table 3 of the previous section, these ﬁndings support the basic prediction
of menu cost models, that an increase in the absolute value of expected aggregate
18 In Table B4 in appendix B, where only bakkal and supermarket data are used, there is a
symmetric V-shaped relationship between dispersion and unexpected PS inﬂation for bakkals. For
supermarkets, the slope on the positive side is the same as that for bakkals, while the slope on the
negative side is positive. This is the only qualitative diﬀerence which arises when only bakkal and
supermarket data are used.
22inﬂation increases dispersion. However, the lack of any systematic diﬀerences in
that relationship across store types may be inconsistent with menu cost models,
since bakkals, pazars, and supermarkets should exhibit signiﬁcant diﬀerences with
respect to ﬁxed and transaction costs, as well as other important parameters. It
could be that real-world sellers follow (S,s) pricing strategies which take the form
of rules-of-thumb (e.g., standard mark-ups), rather than the more sophisticated
optimal (S,s) pricing strategies in menu cost models. This may lead to greater
uniformity across store types than standard menu cost models would predict, which
might explain our ﬁndings.
Unexpected COL Inﬂation
Finally, all the coeﬃcients in Table 4 corresponding to unexpected COL inﬂation are
insigniﬁcant except γ11, which is positive and signiﬁcant at the 10% level. With the
possible exception of pazars, people are not fooled by unexpected changes in COL
inﬂation. Since pazars are small businesses operated by independent local people,
they (or their customers) may be less well-informed than bakkals and supermarkets,
which might explain why unexpected COL inﬂation may have a non-zero impact
on pazar dispersion.
7. Conclusions
The contributions of the paper are twofold. First, we established a new empirical
speciﬁcation of the relationship between dispersion and inﬂation, which more accu-
rately reﬂects the relationship predicted by theory. To demonstrate the potential
misspeciﬁcation bias of existing empirical models, we estimated a common speci-
ﬁcation (9), similar to that in Reinsdorf (1994), which neglects lagged dispersion,
an important theoretical explanatory variable according to the information invest-
ment model. We then showed that adding lagged dispersion produces qualitatively
diﬀerent results. In contrast, our ﬁndings using the new speciﬁcation (11) provides
23support for all the basic predictions in Table 1, except that corresponding to ex-
pected PS inﬂation. In particular, the estimated coeﬃcient on lagged dispersion is
positive and highly signiﬁcant, as predicted by the information investment model,
identifying a new channel by which monetary policy can have dynamic real eﬀects
at the industry level.
We then extended the basic speciﬁcation to incorporate the potential impact
of market structure, and proceeded to test the market structure predictions us-
ing our data set, which is uniquely suited for that purpose, since it contains price
observations from three distinct store types which should exhibit signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ences in market power, ﬁxed and transaction costs, and other characteristics. Our
empirical analysis revealed signiﬁcant store-type ﬁxed eﬀects on dispersion, with
supermarkets exhibiting the greatest level of dispersion, followed by bakkals, then
pazars. We also found signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the relationship between dispersion
and unexpected PS inﬂation across store types, as predicted by signal extraction
models. Furthermore, supermarket dispersion is reduced during seasonal sales peri-
ods, whereas bakkal and pazar dispersion levels are unaﬀected, which is consistent
with the market power predictions of static equilibrium search models. However,
there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the relationship between dispersion and ex-
pected COL inﬂation across store types, which seems inconsistent with menu cost
models. Although the basic predictions of menu cost model are borne out by the
data, the market structure predictions are not. Finally, we found that unexpected
COL inﬂation has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on dispersion, except possibly in pazars,
which suggests that most buyers and sellers are not fooled by unexpected changes
in aggregate inﬂation.
It remains to be seen whether our ﬁndings carry over to other data sets. In
particular, Reinsdorf (1994) found a negative relationship between dispersion and
PS inﬂation, driven by the negative estimate for unexpected PS inﬂation, which
he attributes to signal extraction eﬀects. However, his speciﬁcation neglects lagged
dispersion and aggregate inﬂation variables, so his estimates may suﬀer from mis-
24speciﬁcation bias. Furthermore, expected PS inﬂation may not adequately capture
menu cost eﬀects, and the relationship between dispersion and aggregate inﬂation
may turn out to be positive, even for his data set.
Finally, our work shows that it is misleading to talk about the eﬀects of the
inﬂation rate. While aggregate inﬂation drives menu cost models directly, its eﬀects
in signal extraction models are indirect, since shocks to other industries are ﬁltered
away by rational agents. This suggests that menu cost and signal extraction eﬀects
may be fundamentally diﬀerent, with potentially diﬀerent welfare implications.
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27Appendix A
Table A: Products
Product Mean Inﬂation stdev Product Mean Inﬂation stdev
Rice 0.0486 0.0485 Roasted chick peas 0.0523 0.0496
Pasta 0.0457 0.0544 Walnuts 0.0564 0.0930
Flour 0.0452 0.0361 Raisins 0.0473 0.0451
Baklava 0.0508 0.0317 Apple 0.0509 0.1394
Cookies 0.0508 0.0317 Lemon 0.0453 0.1304
Flodougha 0.0472 0.0347 Tomato 0.0497 0.2703
Cracked wheat 0.0487 0.0304 Green peppers 0.0396 0.3354
Veal 0.0472 0.0386 Cucumbers 0.0409 0.2619
Chicken 0.0446 0.0818 Lettuce 0.0420 0.1472
Mutton 0.0472 0.0411 Zucchini 0.0395 0.2209
Fish 0.0545 0.1898 Scallion 0.0456 0.1722
Sucukb 0.0489 0.0343 Olives 0.0488 0.0232
Oﬀalc 0.0476 0.0448 Honey 0.0496 0.0344
Salami 0.0479 0.0319 Tomato paste 0.0464 0.0610
Sausage 0.0453 0.0283 Halvahd 0.0472 0.0482
Feta cheese 0.0464 0.0388 Jam 0.0469 0.0360
Margarine 0.0501 0.0519 Ready soup 0.0462 0.0300
Cooking oil 0.0485 0.0572 Broom 0.0505 0.0503
Eggs 0.0400 0.1307 Cleaning powder 0.0496 0.0344
Olive oil 0.0504 0.0579 Soap 0.0477 0.0477
Kasari cheese 0.0481 0.0555 Detergent 0.0451 0.0367
Potato 0.0474 0.1125 Bleach 0.0497 0.0316
Onion 0.0530 0.1695 Paper tissue 0.0501 0.0431
Lentils 0.0489 0.0527 Light bulbs 0.0390 0.0417
Chick peas 0.0541 0.0569 Plastic kitchenware 0.0495 0.0388
Dried beans 0.0525 0.0610 Toothpaste 0.0489 0.0404
Sunﬂower seeds 0.0460 0.0420 Toilet soap 0.0470 0.0468
Peanuts 0.0493 0.0470 Shampoo 0.0436 0.0532
Hazelnuts 0.0599 0.1127 Razor 0.0523 0.0579
a A very thin sheet of dough. b A type of sausage. c Sheep viscera. d At y p eo fs w e e t .Appendix B
Table B2: Panel data ﬁxed eﬀects estimation results
(1) (2) (3)
v1 v1 v1










D ∗| EPS| 0.053
[0.018]***
D ∗| UPS| 0.000
[0.011]
Constant 0.078 0.078 0.070
[0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.006]***
Observations 8464 8464 8207
R2 0.37 0.37 0.37
Standard errors in brackets
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
Variable deﬁnitions are given in the text.Appendix B









D ∗| EPS| 0.020 0.024
[0.036] [0.035]






D ∗| ECOL| 0.463
[0.309]
D ∗| UCOL| -0.025
[0.034]
Observations 8115 7952
Standard errors in brackets
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
Variable deﬁnitions are given in the text.
The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors from Arellano-Bond one-step GMM estimation.Appendix B










D ∗| EPS| 0.034 -0.126
[0.036] [0.045]***






D ∗| ECOL| 1.161 -1.917
[0.321]*** [0.551]***
D ∗| UCOL| -0.014 0.002
[0.033] [0.042]
Observations 7952
Robust standard errors in brackets
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
Variable deﬁnitions are given in the text.
The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors from Arellano-Bond one-step GMM estimation.Table 1: Basic Predictions
MenuCost SignalExtraction Information Investment
Lagged dispersion n/a n/a positive
|ECOL| positive n/a zero*
|UCOL| n/a zero* zero*
|EPS| n/a n/a positive
|UPS| n/a positive positive
*Assuming no Lucas-type confusion.Table 2: Panel data ﬁxed eﬀects estimation results.
Dependent variable: The dispersion measure, V
Eq.(7) Eq.(8) Eq.(9)
dmrk 0.014 0.014 0.014
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]***










D ∗| EPS| 0.026
[0.012]**
D ∗| UPS| -0.001
[0.009]
Constant 0.089 0.089 0.088
[0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]***
Observations 10672 10672 10341
R2 0.10 0.10 0.10
Standard errors in brackets
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
Time and market type product dummies are included in all regressions.Table 3: Panel data dynamic GMM estimation results.
Dependent variable: The dispersion measure, V
Eq.(9) Eq.(10)






D ∗| EPS| 0.017 0.014
[0.024] [0.024]






D ∗| ECOL| 1.195
[0.342]***
D ∗| UCOL| -0.004
[0.028]
Observations 10,225 10,022
Standard errors in brackets
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors from Arellano-Bond one-step GMM estimation.Table 4: Panel data dynamic GMM estimation results by store type
Dependent variable: The dispersion measure, V




|EPS| 0.003 0.019 0.020
[0.017] [0.030] [0.041]
|UPS| 0.048 0.000 0.062
[0.020]** [0.024] [0.037]*
D ∗| EPS| 0.029 -0.030 -0.129
[0.034] [0.047] [0.055]**
D ∗| UPS| 0.023 -0.032 -0.109
[0.033] [0.043] [0.053]**
|ECOL| 0.087 -0.019 0.037
[0.035]** [0.045] [0.040]
|UCOL| -0.010 -0.051 -0.028
[0.021] [0.044] [0.032]
D ∗| ECOL| 1.321 1.790 -1.727
[0.333]*** [0.947]* [0.560]***
D ∗| UCOL| -0.008 0.087 -0.021
[0.027] [0.051]*** [0.040]
Observations 10,022
Standard errors in brackets
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
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